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Abstract 
 
In the enterprise application software industry, dominant system vendors (hubs) have 
formed strategic partnerships with small software companies (spokes), resulting in the 
emergence of hub-and-spoke networks. Based upon the concept of software stacks, we 
argue that the governance mechanisms applied by hub and spokes depend on the 
complementarity between hub’s and spoke’s resources. Specifically, we draw on the 
relational view and combine it with the resource dependence theory to develop a 
theoretical framework that explains the link between the type of complementarity and 
differential governance mechanisms. We are able to show that while hubs seek to take 
advantage of complementarities with the entire network of partners, spokes are 
primarily interested in gaining access to complementary resources and capabilities of 
the hub organization. In order to leverage the benefits of resource complementarity, 
hubs mainly invest in network-specific resources to generate value. On the contrary, the 
spokes’ investments are hub-specific. Accordingly, hubs only face minor threats of 
opportunistic behavior on the part of a specific spoke, whereas the spokes’ existence is 
endangered by the threat of opportunistic behavior by the hub. Due to these three 
asymmetries, hubs apply formal governance mechanisms in order to efficiently 
coordinate the network of spokes, whereas spokes rely on informal governance 
mechanisms. 
 
 
Keywords: Relational View, Resource Dependence Theory, Power 
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Introduction 
The structure of the enterprise application software (EAS) industry has been 
undergoing significant changes during the last decades. While early systems were 
custom-developed in a make-to-order fashion, in the 1970s, standardized, monolithic 
systems that covered the majority of the business processes of a variety of customers 
emerged and became the state-of-the-art during the 1980s. This turned the formerly 
diverse industry into an oligopolistic structure with a few dominating major system 
vendors (Campbell-Kelly, 2003). 
In recent years, however, this trend has been countervailed by a tendency towards 
disintegration (Bresnahan and Greenstein, 1999, Messerschmitt and Szyperski, 
2003). Facilitated by the emergence of standards and middleware technologies, like 
e.g. service-oriented architectures, the formerly integrated systems are more and 
more characterized by a high degree of modularity (Baldwin and Clark, 1997). From 
a theoretical point of view, it can be argued that the tendency towards disintegrated 
systems should be mirrored by a higher degree of organizational modularity 
(Conway, 1968, Hoetker, 2006). However, in spite of the increasing 
interorganizational division of labor in the EAS industry, a seamless coordination 
between different organizations and friction-free mixing and matching of software 
components from different vendors is still a vision. Instead, partnership networks 
have emerged in which companies of the EAS industry agree to work together 
closely based on some mutually agreed standards (Gao and Iyer, 2008). Within these 
partnership networks, a limited number of large organizations, often referred to as 
hubs, platform leaders or keystones (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002, Iansiti and Levien, 
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2004, Jarillo, 1988), provide the systems’ architecture as well as generic core 
functionalities, while smaller software companies (referred to as spokes or niche 
players) build their solutions upon and complement these platforms (Iansiti and 
Levien, 2004, Prencipe, 2003). The compatibility and functionality of the spokes’ 
solutions is thereby often ensured through a certification of the spokes’ products or 
resources by the hub organization. The spokes represent independent legal entities 
that, unlike in supplier networks (e.g. in the automotive sector), sell their solutions 
directly to the market. Moreover, partner networks in the EAS industry are special in 
that although there is no direct exchange of tradable goods between the hub and the 
spokes, the networks compete with each other in a system competition that is 
characterized by network effects (Farrell et al., 1998, Shapiro and Varian, 1999). 
We argue that this hub-and-spoke structure may often result in strong imbalance 
between partners, which in turn raises questions about the long term sustainability of 
such partnership arrangements. Hubs are generally perceived to be dominant over 
spokes due to their supremacy regarding assets, investments, market share, profits, as 
well as resource and revenue dependencies (Bala and Venkatesh, 2007). 1 Bearing in 
mind this imbalance between hub and spokes, we argue that it is of special 
theoretical and practical interest to examine governance mechanisms applied in 
partnerships between dominant and non-dominant firms within partner networks in 
                                                 
1 In the network structure observed in practice, hybrid forms exist. Some companies represent a spoke 
in one network, while taking the role of a hub in its own hub-and-spoke network. For instance, IBM 
and SAP are partners but have both established a network of spokes. In order to properly examine the 
impact of firm dominance, we focus on partnerships between dominant hubs and small spokes. 
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the EAS industry. For example, the question is raised how small spoke organizations 
ensure that dominant hubs will not behave opportunistically, e.g. by substituting or 
imitating the small organizations’ products or by replacing the partner with another 
firm (i.e. partner). Power imbalance and the ensuing risk of opportunistic behavior 
call for appropriate governance mechanisms for alleviating partnership risks and for 
ensuring that the expected benefits of the partnership can be realized. 
In order to study differential forms and outcomes of partnerships, previous literature 
has drawn on the economic theory of complementarities (Milgrom and Roberts, 
1995). As such, it has been argued that the success of interorganizational 
arrangements in the software industry is dependent upon the respective position of 
the organizations within a software stack that reflects the architecture of the overall 
system (Gao and Iyer, 2006). Building on existing research, we apply the idea of 
complementarities between software firms to the special case of the EAS industry. 
Specifically, we shed more light on the theoretical reasons for value creation through 
inter-firm complementarity in the EAS industry. By studying the intermediate role of 
alternative governance mechanisms as a major prerequisite for achieving successful 
relationships (Lavie, 2007), we add to previous research that has mainly focused on 
the direct impact of inter-firm product complementarity on partnership success (Gao 
and Iyer, 2008). 
Taken together, this paper aims at theoretically answering the question of how the 
type of complementarity between the partners influences the choice of governance 
mechanisms applied by hub and spoke organizations within the EAS industry in 
order to leverage the benefits of complementary resource endowments. Our 
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theoretical analysis builds on the relational view of competitive advantage (Dyer and 
Singh, 1998) together with the resource-dependence theory (RDT, Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978). Based on these two theoretical lenses a framework is developed that 
explains how the choice of different governance mechanisms by hub and spoke 
organizations in the EAS industry is influenced by three types of interrelated 
asymmetries between hub and spoke. The paper is structured as follows. First, the 
relational view is introduced. Subsequently, in order to develop our theoretical 
framework, the theoretical assertions of the relational view are analyzed in the light 
of relationships between hubs and spokes in the EAS industry. Finally, the 
framework is discussed and conclusions are drawn. 
A Relational View on Hub-and-Spoke Networks 
The Relational View of Inter-Organizational Competitive Advantage 
In drawing on the resource-based view of the firm (RBV, Barney, 1991, Wernerfelt, 
1984) and on transaction cost economics (TCE, Williamson, 1981), the relational 
view of interorganizational competitive advantage (Dyer and Singh, 1998) holds that 
firms can create relational rents when entering into partnerships with other firms that 
provide complementary resources. According to Dyer and Singh, complementary 
resources are “distinctive resources of alliance partners that collectively generate 
greater rents than the sum of those obtained from the individual endowments of each 
partner” (Dyer and Singh, 1998, p. 666f). In order to leverage the potential benefits 
of complementary resources, firms have to invest in relation-specific assets (Dyer 
and Singh, 1998). Accordingly, the relationship itself can become the source of a 
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competitive advantage if in fact it is unique (i.e. specific) and hence hard to imitate 
or substitute by competitors. This actually extends the key argument of the RBV, 
which has its primary focus on the internal resources of a firm (Amit and 
Schoemaker, 1993).  
From a TCE perspective, however, increasing asset specificity leads to higher 
transaction costs, given that organizations that invest in relation-specific assets run 
the risk of opportunistic behavior on the part of their collaborators (Coase, 1937, 
Williamson, 1981). While advocates of TCE perceive this as a trade-off and propose 
integration of transactions into the hierarchical organization as a remedy for 
transaction costs caused by high asset specificity, Dyer argues that transaction costs 
“do not necessarily increase with an increase in relation-specific investments” (1997, 
p. 551). Such a perspective emphasizes transaction value instead of transaction costs 
and holds that both inter-firm investments in relation-specific assets and transaction 
cost discrimination are simultaneously feasible (Zajac and Olsen, 1993). More 
specifically, the central argument of the relational view is that interorganizational 
competitive advantage can be generated through inter-firm arrangements if the 
relationships move away from market transactions and, instead, invest in (1) inter-
firm relation-specific assets as well as (2) inter-firm knowledge-sharing routines, 
exploit (3) complementary resource endowments, and apply (4) effective governance 
mechanisms (Dyer and Singh, 1998). Regarding the persistence of relational rents, 
Dyer and Singh’s (1998) relational view again draws on the RBV of the firm and 
argues that competitive advantages by definition have to be difficult to imitate. 
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Several of the mechanisms that help to sustain competitive advantages mentioned by 
Dyer and Singh can be subsumed under the term “uniqueness of the relationship”.2 
There are indications, however, that entering into unique relationships may not 
generally be the desired end for both parties of a relationship. For example, Lavie 
(2007) argues that alliances with dominant firms may promote the creation of value, 
but make it difficult for non-dominant firms to appropriate the created value. 
Moreover, the effect of power imbalance on value appropriation is found to increase 
with the level of bilateral competition between the firms (Lavie, 2007).3 Lavie’s 
findings of the software industry hint upon the importance of governance 
mechanisms to create and appropriate value in situations of firm dominance. 
However, the impact of resource complementarities on governance mechanisms is 
not explicitly considered. 
This paper fills this gap and further analyzes the consequences of the imbalance 
between hub and spokes in the EAS industry on the alignment between 
complementarities and governance mechanisms from the perspective of the relational 
view. In order to do so, we discuss the sources of relational rents and the resulting 
rent preserving mechanisms in the light of partnerships between dominant and non-
                                                 
2 Namely, causal ambiguities, time compression diseconomies, inter-organizational asset 
interconnectedness, and resource indivisibility prevent competitors from imitating the unique 
relationships of a focal dyad of companies (Barney, 1991, Dierickx and Cool, 1989). Additionally, 
Dyer and Singh mention the scarcity of potential partners and the institutional environment as factors 
that impede an imitation of inter-organizational competitive advantages. 
3 Such a situation of cooperation and competition is sometimes referred to as “co-opetiton” (Nalebuff 
and Brandenburger, 1997). 
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dominant organizations in the EAS industry. While Dyer and Singh (1998) present 
the four sources of relational rents in an unconnected manner, we introduce a chain 
of reasoning that logically relates the different categories to each other, both from the 
spokes’ and the hubs’ perspective. In order to properly examine the alignment of 
resource complementarities and governance mechanisms, we first focus on inter-firm 
resource complementarities. Subsequently, investments in relation-specific assets and 
knowledge-creation that are necessary to benefit from resource complementarities 
and the resulting threat of opportunistic behavior will be analyzed. Finally, the 
consequences for governance mechanisms will be discussed.  
Generation of Relational Rents in Hub-and-Spoke Networks 
Resource Complementarity  
While previous research has focused on differences in the degree of complementarity 
between software firms (Gao and Iyer, 2008), we argue that within hub-and-spoke 
networks in the EAS industry, different types of complementarities exist. Moreover, 
complementarity may not only become important on a technological level, but also 
regarding the commercial and social capital of firms. These different types of 
complementarities are discussed below in order to subsequently study the 
consequences for the governance mechanisms applied by hub and spokes. 
Spoke Perspective. In order to better understand the notion of complementarity it is 
instructive to analyze the reasons for why firms enter into partnerships more closely. 
Several authors have transferred the idea of the RBV on interorganizational 
arrangements, stating that strategic assets may be accessed though inter-firm 
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cooperation (Das and Teng, 2000, Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996, Lavie, 2006). 
Thereby, especially those firms that suffer from a shortage of certain resources will 
try to form partnerships or alliances in order to overcome these resource gaps 
(Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996). However, in order to access resources through 
inter-firm collaboration, firms not only have to be willing to fill their own resource 
gaps, but also have to be attractive as a potential partner themselves, i.e., they have to 
possess certain resources which their potential collaborator lacks. This “duality of 
inducements and opportunities” (Ahuja, 2000) is particularly problematic for small 
and young companies. On the one hand, small and young companies often face what 
Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1996) call “strategic vulnerable positions” and are 
therefore prone to a lack of resources (Welsh and White, 1981). On the other hand, 
due to their limited size and often short period of existence, small and young 
companies will hardly be able to offer significant resources to potential partners, thus 
reducing the possibilities to overcome their own resource gaps through partnering 
(Ahuja, 2000, Dierickx and Cool, 1989). 
The hub-and-spoke networks that emerged in the EAS industry seem to be a possible 
way-out of this dilemma. Through their partnerships with a hub, spokes can access 
external resources and dynamic capabilities (Teece et al., 1997) that the hub disposes 
of. Ahuja (2000) proposes a taxonomy of strategic resources obtained through 
interorganizational cooperation that divide the resource endowments of potential 
partners into technological capital, commercial capital, and social capital. From a 
technological point of view, hubs provide the architecture that the spokes’ solutions 
are based upon. Innovating this architecture on a regular basis is deemed especially 
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crucial in a dynamically changing environment like the EAS industry (Henderson 
and Clark, 1990). Regarding commercial capital, hub companies that usually act on a 
global scale and have a large installed base of customers offer small spokes the 
possibility to access markets and marketing channels that would otherwise be 
unreachable. Furthermore, hubs dispose of social capital that spokes could benefit 
from in that they improve their own visibility and credibility by making use of the 
hub’s reputation and high profile and encourage hub personnel to recommend and 
promote the spoke’s solution.  
Hub Perspective. The hub organization, on the other hand, also benefits from the 
spokes’ strategic resources (Rothaermel, 2001). First and foremost, hubs can exploit 
the spokes’ commercial and social capital to address niche markets they have so far 
not been able or willing to approach. Regarding technological capital, spokes are 
assumed to dispose of specific knowledge in these niches and be especially 
successful in innovating specific modules of the overall system (Henderson and 
Clark, 1990). However, and central to our reasoning, we argue that due to the spokes’ 
mentioned resource limitations, the hub does not gain competitive advantages from a 
singular relationship with one specific spoke. Instead, we opine that the hub benefits 
from the multilateral 1:n-relationship with the network as a whole. 
This becomes clear when considering that the main reasons for the emergence of 
hub-and-spoke networks may be seen in the fact that competition and demand 
heterogeneity have forced large vendors to give up proprietary approaches in order to 
gain market share and strive for becoming a de facto standard (Schilling and 
Steensma, 2001, Shapiro and Varian, 1999). Put differently, hubs face a system 
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competition with rival networks that is characterized by network effects (Farrell et 
al., 1998, Shapiro and Varian, 1999). Therefore, we argue that hubs prosper in 
particular if a great number of spokes participates in their network and offers 
complementary functionalities, a fact that is even reinforced since spoke companies 
will often not be able to offer solutions for different competing platforms due to 
resource limitations. 
 
 
 
 
To sum up, within the hub-and-spoke networks of the EAS industry, spoke 
companies aim at accessing the hub’s resources, while the hub benefits from the 
resources provided by the network as a whole. This distinction in value-generating 
relationships is depicted in Figure 1. While hubs gain value from the network and 
thus, figuratively, form a multilateral relationship with the network as a whole (left), 
spokes enter into bilateral 1:1-relationships with the hub (right). This is summarized 
by the following asymmetry. 
Asymmetry 1: In the hub-and-spoke networks of the EAS industry, the combination of 
complementary resource endowments in a singular hub-spoke relationship only 
provides significant value to the spoke. Hubs benefit from complementarities with the 
network as a whole. 
1 : n 
Multilateral 
Hub Network Spoke Hub 
1 : 1 
Bilateral 
Figure 1: Hub-Network Relationship vs. Spoke-Hub Relationship 
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Investments in Relation-Specific Assets 
The concept of complementary resource endowments of partnering firms suggests a 
potential value gain through combining resources. However, in order to realize these 
benefits, firms have to invest in relation-specific assets (Dyer and Singh, 1998). 
Generally, asset specificity has been defined as the “the degree to which an asset can 
be redeployed to alternative uses and by alternative users without sacrifice of 
productive value” (Williamson, 1990, p. 142). Translated to the case of 
interorganizational relationships, asset specificity refers to the degree to which assets 
are of low usefulness in other relationships. If hub-and-spoke networks are 
understood as a system that collectively produces EAS through inter-firm division of 
labor, investing in relation-specific assets can be interpreted as an “optimization of 
the components [of the system] working in a particular configuration”, resulting in 
combinations that “achieve a functionality unobtainable though combinations of 
more independent components” (Schilling, 2000, p. 315f). Stated in other words, the 
complementarity of the partners’ resource endowments results in a high degree of 
synergistic specificity, i.e., “[t]he degree to which a system achieves greater 
functionality by its components being specific to one another” (Schilling, 2000, p. 
316). 
Regarding the assets that are generally deemed necessary in order to develop and 
market software products, the individuals that are involved in the production and 
marketing process were found to be of utmost importance, rendering software 
production a people business (Boehm, 1987, De Marco and Lister, 1987). More 
specifically and in line with the above discussion on resource complementarities, the 
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knowledge of the involved individuals plays a pivotal role in producing and 
marketing software (Robillard, 1999). This is reinforced in the EAS industry, where 
knowledge about both software development and business processes is needed. Thus, 
in the here analyzed context, relation-specific investments mainly refer to 
investments in relation-specific knowledge creation.  
Spoke Perspective. We argue that the spokes indeed have to invest heavily in assets 
that are specific to the hub in order to participate in the hub’s partner network and 
enable the access to complementary resources and capabilities as discussed in the 
previous paragraph. First and foremost, spokes have to invest in hub-specific 
knowledge accumulation in order to enable the partnership through having their 
solutions and resources certified by the hub. In order to get this certification, spokes 
have to obtain knowledge about the functioning of the hub’s platform and interfaces 
in order to develop solutions that are compatible with all other solutions that build 
upon the same platform. Moreover, developers may have to prove their knowledge 
about the hub’s technology by attending trainings and passing tests. Once the spokes 
have accomplished the certification, continuous investments in hub-specific 
technological and market-related knowledge accumulation have to be made in order 
to keep up with recent developments in the dynamically changing EAS industry. 
Thereby, it is important to consider the difference between information and know-
how (Dyer and Singh, 1998). While information can be codified and stored in data 
bases, know-how involves knowledge that is sticky or tacit (Grimaldi and Torrisi, 
2001). In order to gain access to external sticky knowledge, spokes may have to put 
effort and invest into the creation of absorptive capacity, i.e., “the ability of a firm to 
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recognize the value of new, external information, assimilate it, and apply it to 
commercial ends” (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990, p. 128). Moreover, in order to 
generate relational rents and not to be imitable by other partnerships, this ability has 
to be partner-specific, i.e., in the case of a singular relationship between hub and 
spoke, specific to a dyad of organizations (Dyer and Singh, 1998). Partnering with a 
hub may provide the spoke with access to certain data bases with information on 
technological issues. In order to gain a competitive advantage through leveraging 
complementary resource endowments, however, spokes may need to access know-
how within the hub that is not amenable to codification, e.g. because it resides within 
the experience and long-time collaboration of certain individuals. Thus, further hub-
specific investments into absorptive capacity and knowledge-sharing may be 
necessary. 
Hub Perspective. While spokes invest in hub-specific knowledge creation and 
integration in order to gain relational rents from their partnership with the hub, the 
situation turns out to be different on the hub side. As mentioned above, hubs certify 
the compatibility and quality of the spokes’ solution before entering a partnership 
with a spoke. Thus, hubs as well have to engage in spoke-specific investments to 
some extent. However, as the preceding section on resource complementarities 
showed, hubs benefit from the network of spokes as a whole and thus, figuratively, 
form a relationship with the network (reconsider figure 1). As argued above, due to 
the hub’s striving for becoming a de facto standard, this network is especially 
valuable for the hub if a great number of spokes participates. Therefore, we argue 
that hubs aim at relational extendability, i.e., the “ability to reconfigure existing 
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competencies for new [interorganizational relationships]” (Bala and Venkatesh, 
2007, p. 343). For instance, while spokes strive for getting access to sticky know-
how through developing hub-specific absorptive capacity, we argue that hubs, 
instead of engaging in knowledge-sharing routines with particular spokes, may rely 
on codifying information regarding technological and market-related issues in order 
to efficiently distribute it throughout the network (Grimaldi and Torrisi, 2001). 
According to Bala and Venkatesh, relational extendability may result in relational 
rents by leading to cost effectiveness, high partner density, partnering flexibility, 
partnering agility, greater structural embeddedness, greater control over partners, and 
less resource dependency on partners. Thus, in order to generate relational rents from 
their multilateral 1:n relationship with the network of spokes, we argue that hubs will 
be reluctant to invest heavily in assets that are specific to a singular relationship with 
a particular spoke. Instead, hubs may mainly invest in network-specific assets in 
order to efficiently leverage the complementarities in their multilateral relationship 
with the network as a whole. Summarizing this paragraph on relation-specific asset 
investments, we find the following asymmetry: 
Asymmetry 2: In the hub-and-spoke networks of the EAS industry, only spokes invest 
in relation-specific assets, while the hubs’ investments are mainly network-specific. 
Opportunistic Behavior  
As outlined above, interorganizational arrangements can be perceived as a trade-off 
between the relational rents generated through combining complementary resources 
as well as investing in relation-specific assets on the one hand, and the transaction 
costs resulting from the threat of opportunistic behavior on the other hand (Dyer, 
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1997, Williamson, 1981). We argue that in the hub-and-spoke networks of the EAS 
industry, both hubs and spokes are prone to behave opportunistically to a certain 
extent.  
Spoke Perspective. Since spokes, as discussed above, invest heavily in their 
relationship with a hub, they cannot easily switch to other platform vendors without 
loosing the majority of their up-front, hub-specific investments and being forced to 
re-invest into the new platform. This lock-in, however, ceteris paribus increases the 
hub’s propensity to behave opportunistically, i.e., to exploit the spokes’ lock-in 
situation and take advantage of opportunities at the spokes’ expense (Williamson, 
1975). Thus, the more spokes invest in assets that are specific to their relationship 
with the hub, the more these spokes are at the hub’s mercy not to behave 
opportunistically. Based on Lavie’s (2006) extension of the RBV to 
interorganizational arrangements, we argue that hub organizations may behave 
opportunistically in two important ways. First, hubs may be reluctant to share 
resources with a specific spoke and thus decrease the possibilities of value creation. 
Second, hubs may behave opportunistically and appropriate what Lavie calls 
“outbound spillover rent” (2006), i.e., the hub may capitalize on its dominant 
position by absorbing the spokes’ critical knowledge. Both threats of opportunistic 
behavior will be analyzed subsequently. 
As discussed above, spoke companies benefit from the characteristics of system 
competition in hub-and-spoke networks, since this system competition implies the 
opportunity to access external resources residing inside the hub organization that the 
spokes are highly dependent upon for successfully developing and marketing their 
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EAS. On the contrary, hubs were found to be mainly dependent on the network as a 
whole and not on the resources of a single spoke. The RDT as proposed by (Dyer and 
Singh, 1998) deals with such interorganizational dependencies. Central to this theory 
is the power distribution between organizational actors that results from 
dependencies on external resources that are beyond an organization’s control. Power 
is perceived as the counterpart of dependence, since “the power of A over B is equal 
to, and based upon, the dependence of B upon A” (Emerson, 1962, p. 33). In line 
with the above discussion on resource complementarities, we argue that in the hub-
and-spoke networks of the EAS industry, spoke organizations face a situation of 
considerable power imbalance.  
From a RDT perspective, through participating in the partner network of a hub 
organization, spokes attempt to absorb the constraints posed by the limited access to 
required external resource. In a situation of power imbalance, however, constraint 
absorption is unlikely, since the dominant organization prefers maintaining the status 
quo of power distribution since otherwise it would lose “its bargaining power and the 
advantageous exchange conditions that accompany it” (Casciaro and Piskorski, 2005, 
p. 172). Accordingly, we argue that hubs, although fostering a partner network of 
spokes, are reluctant to grant unlimited access to complementary resources to 
singular spoke organizations. For example, although accessing the hub’s global 
marketing channel could be considered highly beneficial for the spokes, the hub is 
not expected to grant this access in an unlimited way. 
Second, the power imbalance in the hub-spoke relationship together with the high 
degree of investments in relation-specific assets performed by the spoke may lead to 
                             Sprouts - http://sprouts.aisnet.org/8-25
17 
                                 
knowledge spillovers. The hub may behave opportunistically and capitalize on its 
dominant position over the spokes by absorbing the spokes’ critical knowledge that is 
unveiled throughout the partnership and apply it to commercial ends itself. For 
instance, the hub may appropriate these “outbound spillover rent” (Lavie, 2006) by 
imitating a spoke’s functionality after getting access to the spoke’s solutions’ source 
code throughout the certification process. The reason for this may be that the hub 
changes its product strategy and considers functionalities that were formerly out of 
its scope as a part of its core competencies. For a spoke organization, the imitation of 
its functionality can be considered a very harmful act of opportunistic behavior, since 
it may dramatically jeopardize the spoke’s survival. 
Hub Perspective. From the perspective of hub organizations, spokes may follow their 
self-interest and, for instance, offer functionalities to their customers that are also 
covered by the hub’s solution, thus ending up in a situation of competition, which 
may be assumed not to be in the hub’s interest. Moreover, spokes may not comply 
with certain interface standards posed by the hub, thus decreasing the overall 
compatibility of the systems. However, according to TCE, opportunistic behavior in 
interorganizational partnerships is especially likely if the involved actors invest in 
partner-specific assets. The more an actor invests in assets that are specific to a 
certain partner, the more this actor is locked into the relationship, since ending the 
relationship would imply the loss of the partner-specific investment performed ex 
ante (Williamson, 1975). As we have shown above, hubs generally avoid investing 
heavily in assets that are specific to a single spoke. Therefore, we argue that hubs 
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only face minor threats of opportunistic behavior in a singular relationship with a 
spoke. 
Taken together, we find that due to their dominant position and their reluctance to 
invest in spoke-specific assets, hubs only face minor threats of opportunistic 
behavior. On the contrary, the spoke organizations have to deal with the hub’s 
potential reluctance to share resources. Furthermore, the hub may capitalize on 
knowledge spillovers and imitate the spokes’ solutions, posing another class of 
opportunistic behavior. To sum up, we find 
Asymmetry 3: In the hub-and-spoke networks of the EAS industry, hubs only face 
minor threats of opportunistic behavior on the part of the spokes, while the spokes’ 
business model is threatened by the hubs’ reluctance to share resources and the 
potential exploitation of knowledge spillovers. 
Governance Mechanisms  
Out of the four factors that enable the generation of value through interorganizational 
relationships proposed by Dyer and Singh (1998), the application of effective 
governance mechanisms plays a special role because its impact on value generation 
is twofold. First, from a TCE perspective, effective governance mechanisms may 
lower transaction costs and thus directly increase relational rents. Second, effective 
governance mechanism may foster the generation of relational rents by increasing the 
willingness of partners to engage in value creation initiatives, i.e., to combine 
complementary resources and to invest in relation-specific assets and knowledge-
sharing mechanisms. Generally, two types of governance mechanisms may be 
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distinguished. Formal governance mechanisms refer to instruments that are codified 
by contracts, technological standards or through other formal devices that enable the 
partners to exercise control (like e.g. the discussed certification process). On the 
contrary, we understand informal governance mechanisms as implicit coordination 
measures that reduce the threat of opportunistic behavior like e.g. mutual adjustment 
based on socialization and trust (Adler, 1995, Kraut and Streeter, 1995). 
Spoke Perspective. The above discussion on opportunistic behavior showed that the 
spokes have to deal with a considerable threat of opportunistic behavior on the part 
of the hub organization. This threat of opportunism consists in the hub’s reluctance to 
share resources as well as in the threat of knowledge spillover. Dyer (1997) suggests 
that in the face of relation-specific investments, informal governance mechanism are 
better suited for impeding opportunistic behavior of a partner than formal governance 
mechanisms. In a similar way, considering the power imbalance between hub and 
spoke, Casciaro and Piskorski (2005) propose that dependent organizations engage in 
unilateral measures to deal with the limited access to resources resulting from power 
imbalance. The dependent organization is assumed to apply tactics to “restructure 
dependencies by aiming directly at the constraining party in the relationship” 
(Casciaro and Piskorski, 2005, p. 167). For instance, dependent actors may attempt to 
stabilize “the flow of valued resources by socializing members of the constraining 
organization or through the exchange of other valuable goods, such as status, 
friendship, or information” (Casciaro and Piskorski, 2005, p. 168). Following this 
point of view, we argue that while hubs behave opportunistically on a strategic and 
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organizational level, the governance mechanisms that act as a remedy against the 
threat of this opportunistic behavior can mainly be found on an individual level. 
For instance, we have shown that, despite the spokes’ investments in hub-specific 
absorptive capacity, hubs may be unwilling to grant unlimited access to their 
commercial, technological, and social capital. Thus, in order to actually exploit the 
access to external resources, spokes may rely on informal governance mechanisms. 
This assertion is substantiated by the findings of Yli-Renko et al. (2001), who argue 
that external knowledge acquisition from key customers that is found to increase firm 
success is positively influenced by social interaction, the quality of the relationship, 
and the network ties provided by this customers. We argue that Yli-Renko et al.’s 
results may be transferred to hub-spoke relationships in the EAS industry, holding 
that through informal governance mechanisms like social interaction, spokes may 
exploit the access to complementary resources residing within the hub organization 
in spite of the hub’s discussed unwillingness to share resources with a specific spoke.  
Furthermore, informal relationships with decision makers within the hub 
organization that are based on trust may prevent the hub from exploiting the spoke’s 
know-how that is unveiled through the partnership and thus avoid an imitation of the 
spoke’s business model, even though it might be strategically appropriate from the 
hub organization’s point of view. 
However, strategic re-orientation and pressure from a greater number of customers to 
offer a certain functionality (turning the market for this functionality from a niche 
into a large segment) may imply the necessity for the responsible individuals within 
the hub organization to eventually imitate the spoke’s solutions in spite of the 
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spoke’s informal relationships with hub staff. In such a situation, informal 
governance mechanisms may encourage the hub to share knowledge with a specific 
spoke that is valuable for its long-term success. For instance, hub personnel may 
“warn” the spoke in advance and thereby provide the spoke with more time to bring 
in its capability to innovate and to come up with new solutions and functionalities. 
Moreover, hub staff may actively provide the spoke with hints which market 
segments are promising and will not be addressed by the hub in the future (Uzzi, 
1997, p. 45). Thus, informal governance mechanisms can be seen as a possibility for 
spokes both to actually exploit the gained access to external resources and to ensure 
future success.  
Hub Perspective. In contrast to the relational governance mechanisms aimed at by 
the spokes, hubs may more strongly rely on formal governance mechanisms. The 
discussion on opportunistic behavior in the previous section showed that hubs only 
face minor threats of opportunism due to the low amount of spoke-specific 
investments and the spokes’ dependence on the external resources owned by the hub. 
Furthermore, as the discussion on relation-specific asset investments pointed out, 
hubs aim at efficiently coordinating the potentially great number of spoke 
organization. Therefore, we expect hubs to mostly rely on formal governance 
through contracts, technological standards, and the mentioned certification process in 
order to efficiently prevent the potentially great number of spokes from behaving 
opportunistically.  
Taken together, this discussion suggests that the formal governance mechanisms 
applied by the hub in order to efficiently coordinate the network of spokes may not 
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be sufficient for spokes in order to create relational rents and to access sticky 
knowledge that resides inside the hub organization. Instead, informal governance 
mechanisms like social interaction and trust may be necessary to gain competitive 
advantages through the interorganizational relationship with the hub and to develop 
hub-specific absorptive capacity. Summarizing the discussion on appropriate 
governance mechanisms, we find the following proposition. 
Proposition: In the hub-and-spoke networks of the EAS industry, hubs rely on formal 
governance mechanism and standards to coordinate the network and to gain 
relational rents from the hub-network relationship. In contrast, in order to ensure 
long-term relational rents, spokes rely on informal governance mechanisms and the 
development of hub-specific absorptive capacity.  
Summary 
We argue that within the hub-and-spoke networks of the EAS industry, hubs and 
spokes pursue substantially different agendas. More specifically, we find three inter-
related types of asymmetries that together explain the differential governance 
mechanisms applied by hubs and spokes. First, hubs benefit from complementarities 
with the network of spokes, whereas spokes create value through accessing external 
resources that reside within the hub organization. Second, in order to benefit from 
their respective value-generating relationship (bilateral vs. multilateral), spokes 
invest in hub-specific assets, whereas the hubs’ investments are mainly network-
specific. Third, this has significant consequences for the threat of opportunistic 
behavior hub and spoke are exposed to respectively. While hubs face only minor 
threats of opportunistic behavior, the spokes’ business model may be jeopardized if 
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the hub is reluctant to share resources or capitalizes on knowledge spillovers. This, in 
turn, has consequences for the governance mechanisms hub and spoke apply. While 
hubs mainly rely on formal governance mechanisms, spokes seek to apply informal 
governance mechanisms to prevent the hub from behaving opportunistically and to 
gain access to sticky knowledge within the hub organization, thus exploiting the 
access to external, complementary resources and ensuring future success. Taken 
together, we argue that while hubs strive for a standardization of the partnerships 
with small software companies, spokes aim at relational governance and an increased 
uniqueness of their relationship with the hub. Figure 2 summarizes our framework. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Type of Relational 
Complementarity 
Type of Relational 
Investment 
Relative Threat of 
Opportunistic 
Behavior by Partner
Type of 
Governance 
Mechanism
Overall Relational 
Objective 
Multilateral 
(Network)
Network-specific 
LOW 
Formal 
Standardization 
Bilateral     
(Hub-Spoke) 
Hub-specific 
HIGH 
Informal 
Uniqueness 
Figure 2: Theoretical Framework 
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Discussion 
Our preceding analysis has shown that the notion of complementarity and its wider 
implications on partnership governance need to be re-evaluated in a new light when 
partnerships in hub-and-spoke networks of the EAS industry are examined. The 
differential roles that hub and spoke organizations play in such a network as well as 
the power imbalance that exists between the partners result in a chain of 
asymmetries. This chain of asymmetries in turn results in different types of 
governance mechanisms that are preferred by both parties, yet need to be aligned in 
order to achieve mutual benefits from the partnership. 
Our theoretical analysis shows that spokes strive for 1:1-complementarity with the 
hub, while the hub strives for 1:n-complementary with all of its spokes. Therefore, in 
line with the relational view (Dyer and Singh, 1998), the spokes seek to tighten their 
relationship with the hub through relation-specific investments. These investments 
are the basis for achieving a comparative advantage over their competitors. By 
contrast, the hub seeks to invest into network resources that enable economies of 
scale and scope in network management, i.e., hubs strive for relational extendabilty. 
Accordingly, the consequences of opportunistic behavior are more severe for spokes 
than for the hubs. Paradoxically, the only way for the spokes to avoid opportunistic 
behavior of the hub is to invest even more in relation-specific assets, e.g. through 
building up social relationships and mutual trust with hub personnel. Thus, the spoke 
would favor informal governance. By contrast, the hub would seek to increase its 
network investments and thus foster formal governance, e.g. through establishing 
formal procedures on how the spokes’ solutions can be certified. Hence, contrary to 
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the findings of Bala and Venkatesh (1998) who argue that an increased relational 
extendability generally results in relational rents for the partnering organizations, we 
showed that in the context of this study, relational extendability creates relational 
rents only for the hub organization in its relationship with the network as a whole. 
Spokes, in contrast, aim at increasing the uniqueness of their relationship with the 
hub, i.e. the relational specificity (Bala and Venkatesh, 2007). Thereby, spokes may 
thwart the hub’s plan to create value from their multilateral relationship with the 
network of spokes through efficiently coordinating the dyadic relationships.  
Managerial Implications. By incorporating this tension into our research model, our 
study has several important managerial implications for organizations in the EAS 
industry. Hub organizations may learn from our findings and dispense with a mainly 
efficiency-driven view. In order to be successful in the system competition with other 
networks in the long run, hubs have to find a reasonable balance between efficiently 
coordinating the network and satisfying the singular spokes. As we have shown, the 
spokes strive for relational specificity on an individual level, engaging in personal 
ties with hub staff. This implies that for the hub organization, it may be more 
reasonable to systematically install a certain degree of relational governance that 
complements the formal governance through standards and certification (Poppo and 
Zenger, 2002), instead of letting the coordination through personal ties blossom in an 
uncontrollable way. As a lesson learned from our study, the ideal goal of hub 
organizations should be to enable a “mass customization” of the governance in their 
partner networks, i.e., to efficiently satisfy the spokes’ desire for relational 
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governance. Improved technological solutions for collaboration like, e.g., web 2.0 
technologies, may be a possible way towards such a “mass customization”.  
Spokes, on the other hand, were found to aim at informally governing their 
relationship with the hub. We argue that informal ties on a personal level may indeed 
be beneficial for spokes to get access to external technological, commercial, and 
social capital. However, spokes may face the problem that sociologists refer to as 
overembeddedness (Uzzi, 1997), i.e., by, at least in the short run, successfully relying 
on strong personal ties, spokes may miss to develop their own technological, 
commercial, and social capital. If the personal network ceases to exist, e.g. due to job 
fluctuation, spokes may eventually be penalized. Generally, the scenario that the 
spokes face resembles a classical prisoners’ dilemma. If one spoke leverages 
personal ties and thereby undercuts the standard coordination mechanisms, it may be 
beneficial for this spoke. If all spokes do so, however, the whole network and thus its 
participators may eventually lose ground in the system competition with other 
networks that coordinate the relationships more efficiently.  
Theoretical Implications. Apart from these practical implications, our study makes 
important theoretical contributions. First, we complement existing work on the link 
between complementarities in the software stack and the success of 
interorganizational arrangements. Instead of analyzing the influence of 
complementarity on success on a high level, we focused on the alignment of the 
governance mechanisms with the type of complementarity. Regarding the differential 
types of complementarity, we added to previous studies by considering not only 
technological resources, but also the partners’ endowments with commercial and 
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social capital. Moreover, we differentiate the complementarities of the hub with the 
network as a whole as well as with a specific spoke. As such, we find that the type of 
complementarity – bilateral (1:1) versus multilateral (1:n) – heavily influences the 
applied governance mechanisms. Second, we apply the relational view as proposed 
by Dyer and Singh (1998) to the scenario of firm imbalance in hub-and-spoke 
networks of the EAS industry. The relational view holds that both partners to an 
exchange have to invest in relation-specific assets in order to leverage 
complementary resource-endowments. On the contrary, the emergence of partner 
networks in the EAS industry where only spokes invest in assets that are specific to 
the relationship with the hub shows that this does not necessarily have to be the case.  
As a direct consequence of the differences between hub and spoke regarding relation-
specific asset investments, spokes apply informal governance mechanisms with the 
goal of value creation in their relationship with the hub, while the hub strives for 
generating value through the network as a whole. Due to these differing value 
propositions in hub-and-spoke networks, the role of value appropriation, as 
highlighted by Lavie (2007), is of less importance. Other than in more closely tight 
strategic alliances, where partners work together to achieve a common outcome, the 
value of hub and spoke results from leveraging resources and products of each other. 
Limitations and Future Research. One of the main limitations of our theoretical 
framework is its static nature, which takes power imbalance between dominant hubs 
and small spokes as a matter of fact. This view neglects that the power distribution 
between hub and spoke may change over time and eventually turn into a situation of 
mutual dependence (Casciaro and Piskorski, 2005). Ahuja (2000) mentions radical 
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innovations that mark discontinuities in the technical progress as an opportunity for 
new entrants to develop significant resources. In a similar way, the spoke may 
achieve a situation of mutual dependence through developing special commercial or 
social capital, e.g., if a former unimportant customer base turns into a key segment. 
Such an increase in technological, commercial, or social capital that is 
complementary to the hub’s resources may turn the bilateral partnership between a 
hub and a spoke into a source of value for the hub. If the synergistic specificity of 
hub’s and spoke’s resources is high, the hub may decide to merge with or acquire the 
spoke organization in order to internalize the benefits that result from this synergistic 
specificity and absorb the constraints posed by the emerging power of the spoke4. 
Although the small size of spoke organizations and their oftentimes relatively short 
period of existence may render it difficult for the majority of spokes to develop 
resources the hub organization is indeed dependent upon (Wernerfelt, 1984), 
considering the possibility that spokes may become more powerful over time could 
be a promising theme for future research. Specifically, future research could take a 
dynamic process view and analyze the lifecycle of partnerships between hubs and 
spokes (Smith Ring and Van de Ven, 1994). 
As discussed above, the asymmetry in relationship specific investments between hub 
and spoke translates into opposing governance mechanisms which may threaten the 
stability of the partnership in the long run. This discrepancy calls for future research 
                                                 
4 Such a situation of merging with or being acquired by the hub may actually be in the interest of 
many spokes. 
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on mediating governance modes that help balancing out the preferences for informal 
(spoke) versus formal (hub) governance. To this end, it may be interesting to 
examine the role of ICT tools for collaboration as a mediating mechanism. Such a 
collaboration platform would allow the hub to address the needs of multiple spokes 
simultaneously, while still accounting for the requirements of particular spokes 
through 1:1 collaboration. The concept of communities of practice (CoP) may be 
transferred to this scenario, where multiple CoPs would possibly coexist in the hub-
and-spoke network (Gongla and Rizzuto, 2001). 
Furthermore, future research may draw on our theoretical insights in further 
analyzing and empirically validating both the existence of the proposed asymmetries 
between hubs and spokes as well as the causal relationship between resource 
complementarities, relation-specific asset investments, the threat of opportunistic 
behavior, and appropriate governance mechanisms. In order to obtain a more 
powerful explanatory model, the causal links suggested in figure 1 may be enriched 
by considering the consequences and interrelations of the complementarity of the 
technological, commercial, and social capital on governance mechanisms in more 
detail. As another promising theme for future work, we call for an in-depth analysis 
of the informal governance mechanisms applied by the spokes. While our study 
addressed informal governance mechanisms in a general way and mentioned e.g. 
socialization and trust, future research may examine in more detail which, when, and 
how informal governance mechanisms are actually applied. Moreover, it may be 
fruitful to include the success of the dyadic partnerships between hubs and spokes 
from the hubs’, the spokes’, the dyadic, and the network perspective into a 
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comprehensive research model. Such an enhanced research model would explain the 
impact of complementarities on partnership success. However, we argue that the 
incorporation of governance mechanisms as a mediator of this link may result in a 
research model with increased explanatory power. 
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